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Efficient markets are alienating if they inhibit us from recognizably caring about 
one another in our productive activities. I argue that efficient market behaviour is 
both exclusionary and fetishistic. As exclusionary, the efficient marketeer cannot 
manifest care alongside their market behaviour. As fetishistic, the efficient 
marketeer cannot manifest care in their market behaviour. The conjunction entails 
that efficient market behavior inhibits care. It doesn’t follow that efficient market 
behavior is vicious: individuals might justifiably commit to efficiency because 
doing so serves the common good. But efficient market systems nevertheless have 
significant opportunity costs. The discussion yields a range of desiderata for non-




Section One: Introduction  
 
In his Notes on James Mill, in 1844, Karl Marx complained that:  
 
…the mediating process between men engaged in exchange is 
not a social or human process, not human relationship; it is 
the abstract relationship of private property to private 
property…men engaged in exchange do not relate to each other 
as men. 
 
And here’s Friedrich Engels (1845):  
 
The relation of the manufacturer to his operatives has nothing 
human in it; it is purely economic. 
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I offer a contemporary version of this old objection to markets. I argue that efficient 
markets alienate us from one another by inhibiting care in market contexts.  
 
Alienation objections to markets have surprisingly few defenders in contemporary 
moral or political philosophy – certainly as contrasted with distributive objections 
or concerns about exploitation.1 One explanation of the waning influence of 
alienation objections to markets is a problematic inference from the fact that 
individuals can enter into exchanges for lots of different kinds of reasons. You can 
sell your cow to help yourself, to help the buyer, or perhaps to help the cow. It is 
often presumed to follow that any motives that might be required to avoid 
alienation can be encouraged in market contexts without altering the 
organizational infrastructure of the market system.2  
 
But mere exchange - a voluntary transfer for consideration3 - cannot have been 
what Marx and Engels had in mind, nor, for that matter, Philip Wicksteed, when 
he famously said that (1910, 180): 
 
The economic relation does not exclude from my mind everyone 
but me, it potentially includes everyone but you. 
 
For such a substantive economic relation, we need to turn to the arguments for 
markets. In particular, we need to consider the ethical arguments based on 
 
1 For a sense of the richness of these other discussions, see Cohen (2008), Roemer (2017), 
Anderson (1993), and Satz (2010). As for the alienation objection: Liberal egalitarians 
generally avoid critiquing economic motives beyond the basic structure (for discussion, see 
Scheffler (2010, ch. 4), and Cohen (2008, chs. 1 and 3)). Libertarians are satisfied with 
exchanges that respect basic rights (cf. Friedman 1970, Brennan and Jaworski 2015). 
Discussions among socialists tend to be either uncritical of market alienation (Cohen (2001, 
81); Honneth (2017, 16)); or unduly optimistic that the basis for would-be alienation in market 
relationships can be compensated by other areas of social and political life (Miller 1989, ch. 
8; Carens 1981, 204-6). There are two exceptional accounts of Marxian alienation: Brudney 
1998 and Kandiyali 2020. However, these theorists do not engage directly with the 
arguments for markets. Meanwhile, a related alienation objection to impartial moral theories 
has been extremely influential in contemporary moral philosophy: especially Williams 1973, 
Railton 1984, Wolf 2012b. There are no applications of these contemporary discussions of 
alienation in moral philosophy back to political economy.   
2 For discussions of this ‘mixed motive’ defence, see Folbre & Nelson (2000), Sudgen & Bruni 
(2008), Brennan and Jaworski (2015), Sverdlik (2011), Di Norcia and Tigner Larkins (2000). 
3 This is the standard definition; for discussion see Brown & Maguire (2019). 
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Smithian efficiency models.4 These ethical arguments provide justification for 
behavior in conformity with the presuppositions of the efficiency models. A 
certain motivational profile is a constituent of the economic systems envisaged by 
these arguments. As I will argue, motives in efficient market systems have two 
features – being exclusionary and being fetishistic – that inhibit a range of desirable 
modes of engagement.  
 
It is often alleged to be an empirical question which motives predominate in which 
circumstances.5 But this is an a priori result, based on the presuppositions of the 
efficiency-based arguments for market participation, and drawing on some 
pertinent developments in moral psychology and normative theory. My critique 
is directed at any economic system that has justificatory support from the ethical 
efficiency argument for market systems. The conclusion is that the efficiency 
benefits of markets necessarily come with a significant cost.  
 
This cost is not an intrinsic disvalue, or an inherent vice, in market systems. On the 
contrary, I allow that market motives in market systems, given suitably benign 
political and social institutions, could manifest mutual respect and even a certain 
kind of community. However, they are incompatible with caring about one 
another and recognizing that we care about one another in productive contexts. I 
think this opportunity cost is very significant. This is like walking through the 
Highlands without enjoying the view, or reading Ulysses just so you could say you 
did. An alternative economic system that better enables recognizable care in 
production could improve the quality of our lives together very significantly.  
 
My conclusion falls short of constituting an argument for abolishing markets, 
because we don’t yet have a satisfactory sense of what they might be replaced 
with. On this point, here’s G.A. Cohen (2009):  
 
4 It is common (following Sen (1985) to distinguish consequentialist and deontological 
(freedom or rights-based) arguments for markets. I’ll mostly set aside the latter. Among the 
former, some concern the inculcation of virtues or the egalitarian advantages of markets. I’ll 
mostly set these aside as well. I will focus on that large class of Smith-style invisible hand 
arguments according to which there is a domain of market activity the nature and point of 
which justifies a choice principle for participants. Important instances include Heath (2014), 
McMahon (1981), Jensen (2002), Sen (1977, 1984), Hansmann and Kraakman (2000), Boatright 
(2000). On the relation between such domain-specific justifications for profit-oriented 
behavior and ‘stakeholder’ theories, see Heath (2014) and Hansmann and Kraakman (2000). 
5 And for their part, sociologists tend to restrict themselves to such empirical questions; see, 
for instance, Callon (1998); Fourcade and Healy (2007).  
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…the principal problem that faces the socialist ideal is that we 
do not know how to design the machinery that would make it 
run.  Our problem is not, primarily, human selfishness, but our 
lack of a suitable organizational technology: our problem is a 
problem of design. 
 
The present argument is a contribution to our understanding of the socialist ideal. 
I do not know whether there is any feasible economic system that yields a better 
balance of all the values that ought to bear on such a thing. That question awaits 
more interdisciplinary research. I’ll say one or two helpful things at the end. But 
even if there is no feasible non-market economic system, it is important to be clear-
eyed about the shortcomings of market systems – not least, so that we can attempt 
to mitigate them.  
 
 
Section Two: Alienation 
 
Alienation is the state of being problematically inhibited by certain kinds of 
agential structures from certain kinds of positive engagements.6 This is a complex 
relationship between the alienated agent, a specific kind of engagement (with a 
patient, or an activity, or themselves) that they are alienated from, and some 
agential activities or structures that they are so alienated by. To make this more 
concrete, we need substantive conditions for the various argument places in this 
relation.  
 
I will be arguing that markets inhibit a certain kind of positive engagement, so let 
me start by saying what kind of engagement I have in mind. Discussions among 
Marxists emphasize serving others by responding directly to their needs. Here is 
Cohen (2009), for instance: “I serve you not because of what I can get in return by 
doing so but because you need or want my service, and you, for the same reason, 
 
6 For helpful discussions of alienation, see Schacht, 1970; Kain, 1982; Wood, 1999; Brudney, 
2013, 2014; Jaeggi, 2014; Leopold, 2018, O’Neill and Gilabert 2019, and Kandiyali 2020. 
Generally, the significance of my argument is conditional upon the importance of alienation 
as I characterise it, but not as the only interesting characterization of alienation, Marxian or 
otherwise. For a more Kantian approach, see Forst (2017). 
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serve me.” There is a question about how best to understand this. Suppose that I 
were to serve you, seemingly responding directly to your needs, but only because 
I want something from you. This purely instrumental attitude, that one might have 
towards an enemy or a machine, is not plausibly the kind of service that Marxists 
have in mind. For instance, Daniel Brudney says that “in communist society, …my 
production would be for your needs” (1998, 174, Brudney’s emphasis); Kandiyali 
maintains that in communism, “I have produced with the motivation of helping 
you satisfy your needs” (202, 565; see also Honneth 2017, 23). Similarly, critics of 
impartial moral theories almost unanimously emphasize the importance of direct 
motivational responsiveness to others.7 
 
Marxist theorists discuss other conditions of non-alienated engagement, too, in 
particular concerning the prospects for recognition of one’s service. I’ll return to 
these in a moment. But the focus of the central argument to come will concern 
whether one can care about another person while serving them in efficient market 
contexts.8 I will work with the following necessary condition for caring about 
someone. If you care about someone, then, facing a set of options, one of which 
bears on their needs significantly,  
 
FITTING MOTIVE:  You are non-instrumentally motivated by the fact that the 
option would positively impact their needs. 
 
The operative notion of ‘motive’ here is conative rather than affective: more like a 
constituent of one’s intention than something one wants. For example, someone 
who purports to care about the homeless in their neighbourhood, but never does 
anything  to help despite having the means to do so, presumably fails to care. 
Someone who does help the homeless, but only in order to gain esteem from others 
for doing so, also fails to care. I assume that motives are moderately 
 
7 For examples and discussion, see Baker and Maguire (2020).  
8 I am heavily influenced here by the feminist tradition that emphasizes care, especially 
Diemut Bubeck (1995) and Joan Tronto (2013). However, it is important to distinguish care 
about, which is the multi-focal attitude I am concerned with, from care for, which is an activity 
of needs meeting. For some discussion of the distinct question of the compatibility of markets 
and care for, see Sugden and Bruni (2008) and the reply by Folbre and Nelson (2000). I do 
not assume that all alienation involves the inhibition of care. One might be alienated in virtue 
being inhibited from respecting someone, or admiring them, or being in on a joke with them. 
But I will focus on instances of alienation that do involve the inhibition of care. 
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counterfactually robust. If you care about someone, you will be motivated to help 
them out even if doing so is burdensome.  
 
Not all caring is part of an ongoing relationship; one can care about a stranger one 
has just met.9 However, I do assume that caring about someone is at least 
potentially part of a relationship, in the sense that actions that manifest care are 
generally signaled as such, and that this signal is ideally recognized by the 
recipient. Recognition of caring service is not merely the expressed belief that one 
has been so served, but the expression of the fact that one cares about the fact that 
one has been so served.10 Recognition by the agent of this recognition by the patient 
“completes” the caring action.11 
 
One can care about things other than people, of course – for instance about 
products and activities and ideals. The FITTING MOTIVE condition naturally extends 
to caring about other things for their own sake, with responsiveness to needs 
substituted by substantive conditions for honouring the value in question (cf. 
Anderson 1993). A good hatter will be responsive not just to fit but to aesthetic 
considerations, for instance, and a builder not just to the function of a building but 
its form. One can also hope for recognition for making beautiful hats, just not from 
the hat.  
 
Let me say something about the role of agency in alienation. There is plausibly an 
ethically significant difference between separations caused by psychological or 
social forces, on the one hand, from those caused, for instance, by mountains.12 
One is not alienated from another just by virtue of living far away from them. But 
one can be alienated from another by racist norms, or austere etiquette norms, or 
unnecessarily complex bureaucracy. These two sides of alienation – alienation by 
and alienation from – tie together two strands in Marx’s writing about alienation: 
both our alienation from others in capitalism and the role of economic agency in 
 
9 Bubeck, (1995, 232). Even Nel Noddings, for whom, notoriously, all care is personal, agrees 
with this point; see (1984, 39).  
10 Cf. Brudney (2010, 152), Cohen (2009, 34).  
11 Marx, MECW 3, 217, 226, 228. For excellent discussion of completion, see Brudney (1997).  
12 I do not quite insist that this agency condition is essential for anything that can properly 
be called “alienation” (see fn. 6). For instance, it is felicitous to say that scholars can be 
alienated by a pandemic from engagement with their intellectual communities. The language 
is permissible. My point is just that this social structure condition nicely distinguishes an 
important class of cases. 
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creating and sustaining this alienation.13 Market institutions are themselves partly 
sustained by individual actions that conform (intentionally or otherwise) to the 
‘morality of the market.’  
 
Let me turn now to the question of what in virtue of which the inhibition of care 
in productive contexts is problematic. The short answer is that caring about one 
another in production is an important good in life.14 But this claim is itself 
contentious, and calls out for further explanation, both axiological and 
metaethical. 
 
The standard Marxian line is that caring and recognition are constituents of self-
realisation (cf. Elster 1986; Gilabert & O’Neill 2019; Brudney 1998; Kandiyali 2020; 
see also Hurka 1993, 3-5); the standards of self-realisation, in turn, appeal to the 
fact that productive service is an ideal part of human nature.15 I have never found 
this explanation particularly satisfying: two natural and attractive ideas – the 
importance of care and of recognition – do not seem to be best explained in terms 
of an abstract theoretical idea with tenuous unity and metaphysically dubious 
grounds. Rather, I would suggest that G.A. Cohen’s notion of community (2009)  - 
that people care about one another, and care that they care about one another – 
more neatly and attractively systematizes these values. And there are other direct 
sources of support for these ideas, too. The importance of caring about value is 
emphasized in Susan Wolf’s theory of meaningfulness (2012a) and Thomas 
Hurka’s (2001) theory of virtue (as well the discussions of non-alienation in moral 
philosophy, noted above).16 Theorists such as Axel Honneth (2003, 2017), Daniel 
Brudney (1998), and Nancy Fraser (2003) have characterized the importance of 
recognition in our social lives.   
  
 
13 See MECW 3, 154, 217, and MECW 35, 616, for instance. These two strands are partly 
reflected in the different usages of “Entfremdung,” for the state of being estranged, and 
“Entäusserung” for the activity that causes the estrangement.  
14 I restrict my attention to questions about being problematic in terms of a loss of important 
values rather than in terms of a conflict with standards of justice. For discussion of the claim 
that non-alienated labour is a requirement of justice, see Kandiyali (2020, 584).  
15 The modal status of these appeals can vary. Most strongly, with Marx, these appeal to what 
is essential to human nature. More weakly, these might appeal to sufficiently robust facts 
about human beings, with human beings perhaps restricted by some prior ethical condition 
(as in Aristotle’s minimal decency or Rawls’s reasonableness). 
16 It is not a coincidence that Hurka (1993) criticizes perfectionism, and Hurka (2001) 
develops this powerful alternative (see his discussion of this point in 2001, vii).  
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But these further explanatory remarks are not essential to the argument. I just need 
that some such plausible story can be told. The important thing, dialectically, is to 
separate out two possible sources of disagreement. Firstly, one might dispute that 
the notions of care and recognition that I am employing constitute constituents of 
one worthwhile way of theorizing about non-alienation. But disputing this would 
be an uphill struggle, even without any appeal to self-realisation. Secondly, one 
might take issue with either the axiological conjecture that non-alienation so 
understood is valuable, or the metaethical basis on which some such axiological 
conjecture is defended – perhaps by arguing that this requires a dubious 
essentialist metaphysics, or an otherwise problematically objective theory of 
human flourishing. I will not engage these kinds of scepticism any further here.  
 
 
Section Three: The Ethical Efficiency Argument and the Alienation Objection 
 
3.1  Marxist Objections to Capitalism 
 
I presume that ‘capitalism’ picks out that subset of market systems in which one 
class disproportionately owns the means of production, and the other, in virtue of 
that fact, systematically earns less than the value of their labour.17 The primary 
motivation for market-based socialisms is to retain the consequential benefits of 
market systems while avoiding capitalist inequality and exploitation. I remain 
neutral about whether the market socialists are right that these broadly 
distributive injustices can be resolved, at least in principle, in the context of non-
capitalist market systems (cf. Miller 1989, Carens 1981, Roemer 2017). However, I 
think the alienation objection applies to all efficient market systems, socialist or 
otherwise. In this sense, the alienation objection cuts deeper than the inequality 
and exploitation objections to markets. The version of the argument I develop is 
compatible with the presumption of robustly socialist background institutions – 
and indeed, I will presume them in what follows.18   
 
 
17 This is the first condition of capitalism in Fraser (2014, 57), Cudd (2012, 6), and Gilabert & 
O’Neill (2019). See also see also Elliot (1976, 165). 
18 The simplest example is with the Carens’ scheme (1981), in which individuals are explicitly 
directed to earn as much pre-tax income as possible in private firms, in order to do their 
social duty.  
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3.2 The Ethical Efficiency Argument  
 
My argument targets the behavior that would be justified by the efficiency 
argument for markets. The efficiency argument takes Smith-style invisible hand 
efficiency models as a premise, as it were, and advocates the kind of behavior, in 
the relevant contexts, that would collectively realise Pareto efficiency. This is a 
domain-specific indirect consequentialism, with a heavily restricted axiology. This 
principle does not direct individuals to perform efficiency-maximising actions. 
Rather they are directed to conform to their roles in the efficiency-promoting 
system. 
 
The most significant version of such an ethical theory has been developed by 
Joseph Heath (2014; see also McMahon 1981). Heath focusses on the manager in a 
mid-sized firm. Each manager is directed to promote the profit of their own firm, 
within a range of legal and ‘beyond compliance’ constraints: in addition to being 
respectful of contracts and basic legal infrastructure, managers ought not engage 
in monopolistic behavior, for instance by colluding to keep prices higher than the 
market clearing price, and they ought not to exploit informational asymmetries, 
for instance by misrepresenting the quality of their products. The rationale for 
these constraints is provided by reflection on the ideal functionality of the market 
system, namely to use price-responsiveness to allocate scarce valued resources 
across the system efficiently. Call this commitment to pursuing the profit of their 
firm subject to the constraints their commitment to profitability. 
 
An individual marketeer might have such a commitment for different reasons. 
Importantly, they might have this commitment precisely on the basis of the 
indirect consequentialist justification. Assume that they do. This justification is not 
one of their first-order motives; it is a higher-order justification for the principle 
that issues in these motives. But it is not morally idle. Such a benevolent marketeer 
might be reliably disposed not to participate as an efficient marketeer if they come 
to believe that doing so would not conform to an optimal rule (either on the ethical 
grounds that this was not the right rule, or on the economic or psychological 
grounds that the conjunction of the various assumptions didn’t hold).19 Indeed, 
the whole community might be known to accept the authority of market principles 
 
19  Cf. Miller (1989, 221); Brennan (2012); Thomas (2011, 1126). 
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on this basis; this might well be a source of mutual respect and one kind of 
recognition – care that we respect one another.20  
 
3.3 The Exclusion-Fetishism Argument  
 
In my view, the primary instance of alienation is the owner-manager’s relationship 
with customers, employees, and competitors. Both workers and capitalists are 
alienated by the kinds of interactions that they enact by participating in the 
capitalist mode of production. But capitalists have more effective choice about 
whether to participate in this production and on what terms. (This is perhaps why, 
in On the Jewish Question, in 1843, Marx maintained that the behaviour of profit-
oriented capitalists, rather than workers, constitutes the “the supreme practical 
expression of human self-alienation” (MECW, 3, 170).)21 
 
I focus on owner-managers of mid-sized firms in competitive markets. Grant all 
the assumptions needed to support the indirect consequentialist justification of 
their commitment to profitability, and assume managers and other economic 
participants accept this justification for their commitment. Assume the most 
benevolent of background political and social institutions.  
 
There are two ways the marketeer’s motives in market contexts might meet the 
FITTING MOTIVE condition: either if they have fitting motives alongside their market 
motives, or if their market motives are themselves fitting motives. I argue against 
 
20 Compare Miller (1989/2002, 221). Hence G.A. Cohen hyperbolized when he said that the 
market is “intrinsically repugnant” (2009). So, unsurprisingly, did Marx (1844): “The only 
wheels which [capitalism] sets in motion are greed and the war of the avaricious – competition.” 
21 In virtue of these alienated relationships, managers are also alienated from their product 
(insofar as they are not guided by the meeting of needs as such, but by the prospect of 
exchange at market prices), and their own activity (assuming they have the right values). 
This relation of alienation is symmetric with other profit-oriented competitors. Customers 
are derivatively alienated from profit-oriented managers, and from their products, insofar as 
the manager’s commitment to profitability is sufficient to preclude a certain relationship of 
caring recognition between them (more on this later). Customers may also be alienated non-
derivatively from products and producers insofar as they exchange products precisely in 
response to the maximization of their household’s narrow material interest (as required to 
avoid ‘consumption externalities’); but I do not address this question directly here. 
Employees may also be non-derivatively alienated in the same way, e.g. in a willingness to 
switch from one job or community or product to another just on the basis of income-
maximisation. (Here I’m distinguishing the alienated manager deciding to sell inferior 
widgets from the alienated worker readily disposed to make them.) For reasons of space, I 
also do not address the fiduciary relationship between shareholders and managers, and 
between managers and employees.   
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these in turn. The commitment to profitability is exclusionary. This rules out 
FITTING MOTIVES alongside market motives. And market motives are fetishistic. 
This prevents market motives themselves from meeting this condition. I argue for 
these two claims in the next two sections. In the final section, I respond to three 
objections. 
 
One further restriction is important. The ethical efficiency argument for markets 
is, to some extent, constrained by the ‘problem of the second best’ (Lipsey & 
Lancaster 1956), according to which, if the optimal conditions for some outcome 
don’t obtain, it doesn’t follow that approximating those conditions will 
approximate the outcome. It follows that the ethical efficiency argument does not, 
as such, provide support for a system of mixed commitments – to profitability and 
to other pertinent ‘stakeholders.’ It is unclear what becomes of the ethical 
efficiency argument when individuals are systematically representing a range of 
different interests in their price-oriented behavior.22 I’ll consequently restrict the 
discussion to unmixed commitments. It is a task for future work to consider ethical 
arguments for mixed commitments in second-best market systems.  
 
 
Section Four: Part One: The Exclusionary Argument 
 
4.1 Exclusionary Commitments 
 
For a commitment to be exclusionary is for that commitment to be inconsistent 
with being motivated by a certain class of reasons in the relevant context.23 
Exclusionary commitments are rather common. Perhaps you promise your partner 
to decide which school to send your child to just on the basis of your child’s 
education, and hence not on cost, or impacts on others, or nostalgic preference 
(Raz 1976). A good teacher will grade a paper on its merits, unmotivated by the 
impact on the student’s career prospects. A good judge would be unmotivated by 
their personal relationship with the accused.   
 
22 On this point, see especially Sen 1984; see also Matthews (1981), Heath (2014); Hansmann 
and Kraakman (2000). 
23 Raz (1976). In Raz’s work, being exclusionary is a normative property stating a normative 
relationship between one reason and some others, according to which the first reason – the 
‘higher-order’ reason – makes it the case that one ought not respond to the others – the first-
order reasons. I am introducing a psychological analogue of this normative relationship.  
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There are three earmarks of exclusionary commitments. Firstly, these other 
considerations – e.g. concerning the impacts of your school choice on other 
children – are still reasons, in some relevant sense. Relating to this, secondly, one 
may well be affectively responsive to them: perhaps regretful about these 
implications. And thirdly, one might be motivated by these considerations in 
counterfactual contexts. Perhaps one sends an email, expressing regret that one 
couldn’t bend the rules in this case. But still, one will not be motivated by these 
reasons in the context of deciding about school choices.  
 
4.2 The Commitment to Profitability is Exclusionary 
 
The commitment to profitability is exclusionary. The efficient marketeer will make 
decisions – about which products to sell to whom under what circumstances, 
about hiring and firing, about which products to produce or discontinue, which 
factories to open and close – all on the basis of what will best promote the 
profitability of their firm, and not on the basis of loyalty to staff, or a sense of pride 
in making beautiful clocks.  
 
The rationale for this is given by the efficiency argument itself.24 Marketeers ought 
not engage in monopolistic behavior, for instance by colluding to keep prices 
higher than the ‘market clearing’ price. This rules out not just self-interested 
behavior to keep prices high, but also putatively altruistic behavior on behalf of 
other firms. Imagine one firm saying to another: “We won’t lower our [firm A’s] 
prices, to capture your [firm B’s] market share, since that would mean that you [in 
firm B] would need to cut your salaries.” It is an open question whether the market 
at large will be better served by having firm B producing the same gizmos less 
efficiently; with firm B’s production process being valued by the market more 
highly than it should be; with the price of gizmos being higher than it should be; 
which in turn might lead to consumers buying more gadgets rather than gizmos, 
even though gadgets produce less utility, etc. In short, the ‘kindness’ to firm B is 
naïve in this case. Imagine firm B says in turn, “thanks, we will return the favour 
by reducing our production of widgets so that you can capture more market share 
 
24 A separate argument for exclusion maintains that managers have fiduciary duties to 
shareholders (cf. Friedman 1970), and that such duties are themselves exclusionary. I 
continue to set aside such deontological approaches to market ethics.  
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at your higher production price.” In the efficient market system, in responding to 
prices one already takes into account the impact of one’s market behavior on 
peoples’ interests. To attend separately to those interests on their own terms would 
involve a kind of ‘double counting’. Attending to those interests separately would 
involve – so the argument maintains – a kind of naivety about the systemic nature 
of the decision-making context. For by giving this good to this person below 
market price, you are expectably depriving some needier person of the same 
resource or expectably creating less with more – either way misallocating scarce 
social resources. Any sensible economic ideal – an ideal that avoids ‘romantic anti-
capitalism’25 – will require individuals to have some sensitivity to the social value 
of the scarce resources they employ in their productive activities, which in turn 
will require one to follow some kind of information-responsive allocation 
principle. The market provides such a principle.  
 
Significantly, all three features of exclusion apply to efficient marketeers. Firstly, 
the commitment to profitability involves not being motivated by the excluded 
first-order reasons in market contexts; it doesn’t entail that these other 
considerations are not reasons. The prospect of a loyal elderly employee’s 
subsequent financial troubles – call him ‘Morrie’26 – and the fact that he has been 
loyal to the company for many years are bona fide reasons. The commitment to 
profitability excludes motivation by these reasons. Secondly, the commitment to 
profitability does not entail that the marketeer in charge will be indifferent to 
Morrie’s plight altogether. It may be that the efficient marketeer has a range of 
affective (rather than motivational) attitudes that someone who cared would have. 
Perhaps the marketeer greatly regrets having to make this decision; wishes it were 
otherwise. The marketeer may also manifest caring motives towards Morrie 
outside the market context. But the efficient manager would not show preferential 
treatment, for instance by allowing Morrie to work for an extra month until he is 
eligible for retirement. Nor would the efficient marketeer, considered just as such, 
be in any way motivated to do so, since doing so would only hinder profitability. 
And thirdly, were it not for the exclusionary commitment, the agent might well be 
motivated to help. This is compatible with caring about the other more generally 
– and might well be common knowledge between the two of them. The marketeer 
 
25 Miller (1989/2002, 208). 
26 Morrie Cohen was “dismissed because it no longer paid the boss to pay him” (Cohen, 2000, 
181). 
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might well be motivated to help Morrie in other contexts, and perhaps to apologise 
that economic imperatives forced the choice in this case.  
 
These exclusions only apply in the appropriate contexts. One’s commitment to 
being a good teacher only constrains one’s motives qua teacher. If you are grading 
your son’s paper, your commitment to being a good teacher excludes facts about 
his prospects from motivating you. But these facts can reasonably motivate you 
when he falls sick during class. The exclusionary nature of efficient exchange does 
not mean that buyers and sellers cannot care about each other at all. It means that 
the efficient buying and selling cannot manifest27 their caring about each other.  
 
This is important. I’m not arguing that you cannot care about someone with whom 
you interact on efficient terms in market contexts. I’m arguing that your efficient 
market interactions cannot manifest your care about each other, given that care 
involves the FITTING MOTIVE condition. That is all I need for my argument. 
Excluding care-based motives in a context is not incompatible with manifesting 
care in other contexts. But it is incompatible with manifesting care in this context 
alongside one’s market motives.  
 
4.3 Exclusion in Non-Ideal Contexts 
 
It is important to note that the exclusionary nature of the commitment to 
profitability does manifest itself in non-ideal contexts – so long as they are not too 
non-ideal.28 To see this, just think about other exclusionary activities. I am no 
perfect teacher, and I do not operate in a perfect educational system. But I still omit 
to give students grades on the basis of need rather than merit. And, in doing so, I 
am often not motivated at all by their need. The exclusionary nature of promising, 
requesting, planning, etc., also clearly persist in non-ideal contexts. Similarly, in 
deciding who to fire, who to hire, who to buy from, who to sell to, on the basis of 
 
27 I intend ‘manifest’ to means something like ‘partially constitute’ here, rather than the sense 
of ‘manifest’ in which it is consistent with the possibility of insincere signalling.  
28 Under sufficiently non-ideal conditions I permit welfarist considerations to influence my 
grading. And likewise with efficient markets. But then we encounter second-best problems, 
as noted above. 
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profitability, one is thereby not (first-order) motivated at all by the welfare of 
implicated individuals (compare Wicksteed 1910, 180 and Heath 2014, 102).29 
 
 
Section Five:  Part Two: The Fetishism Argument 
 
5.1 The Fetishism Argument 
 
The exclusion argument purports to establish that one cannot manifest care in 
addition to efficient market motives in one’s participation. But this leaves open the 
question whether one’s market participation might itself manifest care for one’s co-
participants. For comparison, the promise only to consider one’s child’s welfare in 
choosing which school to send them to, while exclusionary, is clearly compatible 
with manifesting care for one’s child. In this section, I’ll argue that the motivations 
of efficient marketeers are fetishistic and so fail to meet the FITTING MOTIVE 
condition. Of course, the central point here isn’t exactly that the end is fetishistic – 
and as it will turn out, that term has a somewhat slippery meaning. Rather, the 
point of the discussion of fetishism is to draw out the contrast with FITTING 
MOTIVES.  
 
We can start with this. Caring about an end for its own sake, and hence, inter alia, 
being motivated by its interests as such – is fetishistic if the end is not valuable in 
itself.30 It may still make perfect sense to adopt the end. Trying to score more goals 
than the other team, or bag all the Munros, or start work at 9am would be fetishistic 
if one cared about these things for their own sakes.  
 
Consider an analogy with ecological systems. We might aim to increase ecosystem 
health, not because we care about the ecosystem, but because we care about the 
individual animals in the ecosystem and aiming to increase ecosystem health is 
the best way to help all the affected animals given either our ignorance about the 
holistic dynamics of the ecosystem or the difficulties and risks in intervening 
 
29 It is an interesting question for another time how the exclusionary nature of efficiency 
connects with the exclusionary nature of property more generally, which latter is also clearly 
significant in non-ideal contexts. 
30 Cf. Smith 1994, 75; Frankfurt (1988). Marx uses ‘fetish’ slightly differently; for discussion 
see Leopold 2018. 
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accurately. As this example suggests, it might make perfect sense to have a 
fetishistic end in a sufficiently complex system given a sufficiently challenging 
epistemic situation. And indeed, this is a decent metaphor for the kind of epistemic 
challenges presented by the standard Hayek-style knowledge arguments (cf. 
Hayek, 1945), building on a Smith-style market system.  
 
Just so, the efficient marketeer’s orientation is fetishistic. The efficient marketeer 
qua marketeer is directed - by the terms of the efficiency models, their own 
functional role, and the associated ethical arguments – to promote profit in market 
contexts. This end, the profitability of their firm, is not valuable in itself. And 
efficiency, as such, is not non-instrumentally valuable. I’m eating a banana and 
you an orange when we would prefer to have switched; but I still really like 
bananas. 
 
Of course, sometimes giving someone a bonus, or retaining an inefficient elderly 
employee, or improving safety standards, will improve overall productivity. 
Happier and safer and more secure workers are generally more productive. The 
profit-maximising marketeer will be motivated to provide such a bonus. Strictly 
speaking, though, the marketeer’s motive is of the form ‘this happiness-inducing 
action will make these workers more productive,’ not simply ‘this happiness-
inducing action will make these workers happier.’ Not only do facts about persons 
fail to appear in the content of the efficient marketeer’s motives, facts about their 
welfare also fail to appear.31 Furthermore, the efficient marketeer will abandon any 
motivation to take the option that benefits some salient individual (whether an 
employee, customer, or what have you, and irrespective of their non-market 
relationship) in a market context whenever doing so ceases to contribute to 
profitability (subject to the constraints). Just as enlightened self-interest isn’t 
altruism (being nice to someone’s mother so they’ll go out with you isn’t a way of 
caring about their mother), so enlightened profitability does not manifest care for 
co-participants.32  
 
31 Cf. McMahon (1981, 269) on the irrelevance of ‘proper names’ in market decisions.  
32 For further discussion of ‘enlightened’ behavior in market contexts, see Jensen (2002, 245) 
and Heath (2014, 79). This applies to both of two schools of thought – the Walrasian 
‘coordinating’ model and the more recent ‘creative bargaining’ model (Ostroy and 
Makowski 2001).   
The coordinating model assumes (like the welfare theorems) that competitive 
firms are, by and large, price takers, so that the marketeer is responsive rather than pro-
active; prices direct activity, in the first instance, and individual market participants merely 
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The argument here is analogous to, but cuts deeper than, the objection to impartial 
moral theories that they yield unduly abstract motives in friendly contexts. The 
Act Consequentialist can avoid some of these concerns because they can be 
motivated by considerations bearing on an individual’s welfare as a way of caring 
about the general welfare.33 But the marketeer’s objective is not to promote the 
general welfare, nor even to promote a part of the general welfare. They are at least 
two removes from that objective. They are aiming to promote the profitability of 
their own firm, thereby to promote efficiency, which can contribute to the general 
welfare. Facts about the good of individuals don’t play any role in their first-order 
reasoning at all. 
 
5.2 The Sophisticated Marketeer reply 
 
This appeal to the consequentialist literature suggests an alternative response. I 
have been assuming that the efficient marketeer is always motivated by profit as 
such. But this assumption is actually rather dubious. Managers who ruthlessly fire 
staff, close factories, and lower the quality of their products in precise 
 
respond in profit-oriented ways. Managers need not be looking for ways to make profit at 
each other’s expense. Rather, they respond to prices as given representations of prevailing 
social valuation of scarce resources, in ways designed to maximise the profit of their own 
firm. On this coordinating model, managers can continue to manifest creativity in their 
choice of what to produce, and their non-market choices, such as the division of tasks, 
between workers, and between workers and managers.  
The coordinating marketeer knows people only make exchanges that benefit 
themselves relative to social cost. They know that in hiring and firing, buying and selling, 
their allocations of resources, in also being so responsive to interest and social value, conform 
to optimal efficiency rules. Everyone just wants resources allocated with maximal efficiency, 
and everyone knows the rules. So, when the cost of one factor increases, so that employers 
have to lower wages, they expect to lose a percentage of staff, and the staff know this too. No 
hard feelings. Similarly, the coordinating marketeer isn’t competing with the customer either, 
really. The price is the price, and you have whatever stock you have, and they want it at that 
price or they don’t. There is a sense in which they are competing with their competitors, of 
course, for each is trying to innovate the production process to capture market share. The 
proscription on exploiting information asymmetries doesn’t require one to share new 
production techniques.  
On the bargaining model, marketeers bargain ‘creatively’ for the terms of an 
exchange; and prices reflect this bargaining process. Individuals need to attend carefully to 
the particular situation of their opposite number, and to the needs and interests of consumers 
in the future, and they need to respond creatively and dynamically to opportunities that they 
see and create. Here, individuals are more actively engaged in the market process as 
adversaries. A defence lawyer might work hard to defend a client they know is guilty only 
because of their common-good argument for the adversarial trial system. Likewise, the 
bargaining marketeer might work hard to make a profit at another party’s expense only 
because of their common-good argument for the adversarial market system.  
33 Cf. Baker and Maguire (2020, 406). 
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responsiveness to profitability calculations, are probably less successful at 
promoting the profitability of their firms than managers who exercise compassion, 
show loyalty, and who are guided by the ‘laws of beauty.’  
 
Profitability, like happiness, is not best promoted directly.34 The standard on 
motives yielded by the ethical efficiency arguments is even more indirectly 
consequentialist: have whichever motives most conduce to one’s firm’s profit-
maximisation (within the beyond compliance constraints). Hence, if there were 
various caring motives that better conduced to profit-maximisation, these would, 
in fact, be justified by the ethical efficiency arguments. Consequently, the objection 
continues, the marketeer can, at least in some cases, meet the FITTING MOTIVE 
condition while complying with the efficiency models. This ‘sophisticated 
marketeer’ (modelled on Peter Railton’s (1984) ‘sophisticated consequentialist’) is 
not simply a long-game profit-hunter. Their motives are conditional rather than 
instrumental. They really do (take themselves to) care about their customers, their 
products, and their employees. It is just that these concerns are regulated by a 
higher-order disposition to retain such a set of commitments in market contexts 
only if it conduces sufficiently to profitability over some suitable time-horizon. 
 
There are two problems with this defence. The first is that it can’t capture all the 
cases. A manager who is only motivated by loyalty, compassion, and aesthetics 
might survive for a while in a competitive marketplace. But insofar as they are 
genuinely responsive to some higher-order condition of long-run profitability, 
there will be many situations in which they face a choice between these values and 
their commitment to profitability. Indeed, the main point of the ethical efficiency 
arguments is to provide a justification for the kinds of deviations from ‘ordinary 
morality’ that are likely in competitive market contexts.35  They have some 
justification for prioritising profitability in such cases, namely the ethical efficiency 
argument, together with the presumption of political institutions that provide 
unemployment benefits, lifelong education, etc. It follows that the sophisticated 
marketeer will not have sufficiently robust fitting motives.  
 
 
34 Cf. Railton (1984, p.140 and following) 
35 See especially McMahon (1981). 
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The second problem concerns their commitments themselves. Consider an 
analogy from Cocking and Oakley (1995). An ambitious young philosopher 
befriends an older professor to advance their career. The young philosopher comes 
to care about the older professor. But the conditionality remains: if the relationship 
ceased to be professionally advantageous, the younger philosopher would 
withdraw. This relationship is better than acrimony. But still, there is clearly 
something problematic about this relationship. According to Cocking and 
Oakley’s diagnosis, the ‘governing conditions’ of the young philosopher’s 
commitment to the relationship are incompatible with friendship. This explains 
our inclination to say that the young philosopher doesn’t really care about the older 
professor.  
 
Likewise, there is something problematic about our sophisticated marketeer. The 
problem is not just with their first-order motives, which I grant will sometimes 
meet the FITTING MOTIVE condition. The problem is rather with their governing 
conditions – their commitments themselves. They often ask after your children, 
but they won’t consider the impacts on you or them in deciding to switch 
production knowing you’ll lose your job and probably have to move across the 
country. Again, there is a good rationale for this, and I’m not saying the choice 
would not be justified all things considered. I’m just drawing attention to a feature 
of the practical reasoning of the efficient marketeer. Just like the ambitious 
philosopher, the nature of their commitment, and not just their motives, is in 








Section Six:  Three Objections and Some Refinements 
 
6.1 The Games – Markets Analogy  
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Lots of activities are exclusionary and/or fetishistic without being problematic. 
Exclusion is a common feature of social roles, as illustrated by the examples of 
judges, teachers, etc. Some activities are both exclusionary and fetishistic: in 
particular, competitive games. But competitive games seem unproblematic. I have 
argued that efficient markets are exclusionary and fetishistic, but it doesn’t follow 
that they are in any way problematic.  
 
Competitive games are usefully analogous to efficient markets in various respects: 
both involve intrinsically valueless ends (e.g. getting a small ball into a distant 
hole) and both are exclusionary (since one ought not be motivated in the relevant 
context by one’s opponent’s concern to win). Games have a process-inducing end 
rather than an intrinsically or consequentially valuable end.36 This offers another 
line of defence for efficient markets. As noted above, a benevolent marketeer will 
recognize that the pursuit of profit is not something that the marketeer cares about 
for its own sake, but rather for the sake of the efficiency benefits that ultimately 
accrue across the system.37  
 
The problem with the analogy is this. Competitive games are constituted by 
attempts to engage in otherwise unnecessary activities (Suits, 2005; set aside so-
called ‘serious games’ (Flanagan 2013)). You wouldn’t be running around on a 
court, or hitting a small ball with a metal stick, if you weren’t playing tennis or 
golf. But we would still need to look after elderly people, build houses, educate 
students, heal the sick, clean our toilets, etc. even if there were no market for these 
activities. This is true of lots of other institutional activities as well. If we didn’t 
have the institution of ‘parent’ or ‘teacher’ or ‘judge’ or ‘marriage’ there would still 
be child rearing and educating and punishing and love.  
 
It is plausible enough that efficiency is the ‘point’ of a market system.38 But it 
doesn’t follow that efficiency is the only point of all our economic behavior. The 
organizational structure of markets – extrinsic motivation, competition between 
firms and between firms and customers, decentralization information provided in 
exchange, a certain division of responsibilities, all impersonally commensurated 
 
36 Cf. Nguyen (2016, 125). 
37 Compare Miller (1990, 221). 
38 Compare the assumption in the title of Heath (2019): “Is the Point of the Market Pareto or 
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency?” 
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across a massive system – is clearly not essential to all the underlying economic 
activity (even if we attend just to traditionally marketized activities, setting aside 
reproductive labour, caring labour, state-based economic activity, etc.). This raises 
the question of what are the relevant values at stake in all this economic activity. 
Plausibly enough, efficiency is a desirable feature of any economic system, pro 
tanto, and other things being equal. But in the case of economic organization, other 
things are never going to be equal. And it is not at all plausible that efficiency 
(together with respect for property rights) is the only desirable feature of all this 
economic activity.39  
 
Interestingly, it would be better if economic organization were more like the 
organization of games, in one sense. Games are designed to realise values 
instantiated in the activity rather than by consequences of the activity. In the case 
of markets, the opposite is true: the system is not designed to be responsive to 
values instantiated in the activity at all (beyond respect for property rights). The 
system is designed consequentialistically, in this sense. But there are many values 
that can be instantiated in productive activity. This is where there is the potential 
for a tremendous opportunity cost. Just as the value of friendship is not just the 
value of the benefits that friends provide for each other, the values realizable by 
participants in an economic system far outstrip the benefits of efficiency. 
 
I offered a sketch of some of these values earlier, referring to meaningfulness, 
authenticity, and recognition. The dialectical point, in response to the games-
markets analogy, is simply that there are many important values at stake in 
economic activity, many of which are central to the good life, and many of which 
are inhibited by efficient market participation. There is, in consequence, a 
significant opportunity cost to markets. Rather than games, markets are more 
analogous to activities in which some end is pursued without realizing the values 
that can be instantiated by alternatives: opaque but moderately efficient 
bureaucracies, or ‘teaching to the test,’ or walking through the Highlands without 




39 It is likely that Joseph Heath would agree, since he understands the end of Pareto 
optimality as a ‘third best’ solution to the problem of economic organization (2014, ch. 7). 
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6.2 Caring Beyond the Market?  
 
Consider another objection. Even if market interactions themselves fail to meet 
FITTING MOTIVE and thereby fail to manifest care, the market system is just one part 
of a larger system of social organization. Individuals are free to manifest care for 
one another in their personal lives and perhaps in their political lives. (And, their 
market interactions may well manifest mutual respect.) This line of thought is 
naturally allied with skepticism about whether care in production is a necessary 
constituent of the good life. The alternative suggestion is that, insofar as care about 
others is a constituent of the good life, what matters is that one cares about others 
in certain domains, and perhaps that one cares about others enough across the sum 
total of one’s social interactions.   
 
One thing the exclusion-fetishism argument might yield is an ethical justification 
for limits to markets, precisely at the point at which they begin to restrict the scope 
for individuals to manifest enough care for one another. This is already an 
interesting result, for this argument is not represented in the contemporary 
literature on the ethical limits of markets, most of which focusses on specific goods 
(such as organs or sex), or types of goods (such as ‘noxious’ goods in Satz (2010)), 
rather than on the opportunity costs of extensiveness of the commitment to 
profitability in social life as such.  
 
This connects with another line of defence specific to market socialism. Suppose 
that our basic needs were guaranteed beyond the market: not just health care and 
lifelong education, but guarantees of free time, a safe working environment, well-
designed recreational spaces and robustly funded public arts. Throw in a 
comfortable basic income. There are tricky political and economic questions about 
provisioning this, but set them aside for now. Suppose that market systems were 
carefully restricted just to the distribution of private resources that we merely want 
– leather jackets, haute cuisine, and subwoofers. It seems reasonable enough that 
people ought to trade-off their access to some of these goods with their access to 
others. Suppose that sufficient overlap might be found between such a restricted 
market system and the domain of mere wants. Does this offer the prospect of a 
market without alienation?40  
 
40 Compare Carens (2003, 146-148) and Kandiyali (2020, 574). 
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I don’t think so. There are two key points here. The first point is that we can 
manifest care not just in the meeting of basic needs but in providing anything of 
significance to someone. In friendship, for instance, the spontaneous indulgence 
of a whim can be just as meaningful as providing food. Likewise, a pastry chef 
might show their love by agonizing over tiny details in a cake. You can manifest 
the fact that you care about me by fixing either teeth or my speakers. By doing the 
latter, you can also manifest your care about music appreciation.  
 
The second point – and this is also why the alienation argument doesn’t merely 
establish a justification for limits to markets – is that the non-market values under 
consideration (meaning, authenticity, recognition, etc.) are at stake even in 
relatively small-scale interactions.41 My meeting your need and your meeting 
mine, each out of concern for the other, realizes more value than our exchanging 
the same items each for our own sake. (I’m assuming we can hold other things 
fixed here, such as the extrinsic significance of the relevant needs.) The 
opportunity cost is, in that sense, intrinsic to an efficient market system of any size. 
But this value is also accretive. As relationships and institutions based on such 
mutual care constitute more of our lives together, with them grow relationships of 
trust42 and loyalty, and mutual dependency, greater scope for compassion, less 
vulnerability, and, perhaps, less existential angst. Or to put the point conversely, 
the degree of alienation plausibly increases with the significance and extent of 
needs that are responded to ‘abstractly’ rather than directly.  
 
6.3 Caring Roles in Organised Institutions   
 
This line of thought relates to a third objection, this time to the necessity of FITTING 
MOTIVE for care. I appealed to the FITTING MOTIVE condition to argue that profit-
oriented market behavior is exclusionary and fetishistic. However, it might be 
objected that the FITTING MOTIVE condition is most plausible in paradigmatic cases 
of caring in personal contexts. It remains an open question whether this condition 
is an appropriate standard in massive institutional contexts, such as a globalized 
economy with complex and sophisticated divisions of labour and lengthy and 
 
41 This is implicit in Cohen’s ‘camping trip’ example (2009).   
42 On the contrast between trustworthiness and mere reliability, and some connections 
between trustworthiness and continuities across one’s commitments, see Baier 1991. 
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complex supply chains. By contrast, it seems possible in such contexts that one 
might care about another precisely by conforming to a suitably well-designed role, 
even if it doesn’t turn out that each individual’s motives reliably conform to 
FITTING MOTIVE. This might well be the best way to think about conformity to price 
in a massively integrated economic system, given the efficiency argument. 
Conforming to the terms of the market system might well be how one manifests 
one’s care for others in a complex economic system. The benevolent marketeer 
who follows the ‘implicit morality of market’ might thereby manifest care for other 
market participants by so doing – even if they don’t meet the FITTING MOTIVE 
condition. So runs this line of reply.  
 
It is true that the specific standards of care in personal contexts, such as with close 
friends or family, cannot be expected to provide a fully satisfying set of standards 
for interactions in a massive economic system. There are degrees of attentiveness 
to one’s friends that one could not possibly meet for all of one’s customers, for 
instance. In order for care to yield a fundamental ethical standard in economics, 
we need a theory of how standards of care vary in different kinds of contexts. This 
is a big task that cannot be fully undertaken here. However, I will aim to say 
enough to undermine the contention that ideal behaviour in efficient market 
systems is a fully satisfying way of caring about one another in our productive 
lives.  
 
The first point to notice is that institutionalizing interactions can enhance an agent’s 
ability to recognizably care about someone. There are various explanations for 
this. (i) Specialisation can enable deeper engagement: Divisions of labour don’t need to 
be ‘cretinising’ (as in Adam Smith’s pin factory). They can instead enable some 
individuals to focus on specific needs while trusting that others individuals will 
focus on relevant other needs. Such a division of labour can facilitate deeper forms 
of engagement with distinctive values. (ii) Collaboration can improve one’s epistemic 
situation: Institutions are valuable and dynamic sources of improved 
understanding about how to meet needs better. It is obviously not likely that one 
will know as much about one’s customers or patients or clients as one does about 
one’s children. However, it doesn’t follow that one will not know as much about 
what will meet a specific need. Many idiosyncratic facts about an individual will 
be irrelevant to meeting a specific need. Much of the relevant knowledge is 
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general. Institutions can greatly increase an individual’s understanding of how to 
meet a need by professional training and ongoing knowledge exchange on large 
and small scales. (iii) The value in integrating levels of caring engagement: Plausibly, 
there are multiple agential levels of care in the ideal case: one individual, or several 
in collaboration, manifests care about one patient, as one amongst an identifiable 
group of patients with specific needs. This interaction is organized in the larger 
context of community care. These community interactions are, in turn, organized 
with other communities in the context of a larger caring political entity such as the 
state, and so on. Each level aims for a kind of fitting engagement with values suited 
to its level of organization, and a fitting engagement with agential entities at lower 
and higher levels of organization.43 This is another important manifestation of our 
care about the fact that we care about one another. 
 
There are also some familiar limitations associated with institutionalizing care. 
One concerns transparency: often, the larger the institution, the less transparent is 
the full justification for some particular choice both to agents and patients. Another 
concerns standardization. The greater the number of agents and patients managed 
by a given rule, the less responsive any application will be to the specific abilities 
of the agent and needs of the patient. This applies also to the agent’s knowledge 
of their abilities and the patient’s needs. A similar point applies to commensurability 
of goods: on the supply side, as the exchange value of one good is a function of the 
supply and demand of many others; and on the demand side, as the relative utility 
of one good is a function of all the other private goods the individual prefers to 
have than not. The more (kinds of) trade-offs that one’s choice principle is 
responsive to, the less particular agents can be committed to meeting particular 
needs. Finally, there are issues concerning domination. It may improve efficiency 
or replicability to have a greater number of decisions managed centrally, but this 
leaves individuals with less discretion to make choices based on their knowledge 
of specific abilities, needs, and non-financial circumstances. This connects with the 
amount of discretion allocated to a specific role. The commitment to efficiency 
constitutes an extremely rigid limit on appropriate choices.  
 
Now recall two structural features of alienation: firstly, that it comes in degrees, 
varying with the extent to which one manifests care and can expect recognition for 
 
43 For more on this kind of level-specific suitability, see my ‘Rewiring Ethics’ (ms).  
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one’s productive endeavours, and that it is imposed by will rather than nature. I 
submit that productive institutions are more alienating, the worse they fare 
concerning the provision of caring enhancements and caring limitations (as 
introduced in the previous two paragraphs), relative to the extent to which these 
constraints are imposed by will rather than nature. And here it is striking that 
efficient markets fare poorly concerning all these standards. 
 
 In the case of the market, the allocation rule is responsive to all resource use by 
everyone across the global economy. It may be true that an individual accepts their 
role in the market system because everyone’s doing so serves the common good. 
But the choice principle that guides their motives and behavior in particular 
market contexts leads them to make decisions on the basis of considerations that 
are very distantly related to the needs of the person they are ostensibly serving. 
There are various kinds of additional distance. These features intensify the degree 
of alienation between agent and patient. 
 
Firstly, the price of the good is sensitive not just to the supply of this resource and 
the demand for this resource. It is also sensitive to the supply/demand functions 
for all the other resources that bear on its production. This sensitivity is, famously, 
invisible to the individual at the point of withholding a resource. This has a 
familiar upside, but also a less familiar downside, since the very invisibility of the 
mechanisms determining price means that often neither of us can know why you 
are withholding a good from me in a particular instance.  
 
Secondly, an individual’s willingness to pay a certain amount for a good is a ratio 
of need for this resource and needs for every other marketized good. To show the 
difference, contrast a single adult with an adult with financial dependents, but 
with otherwise similar consumption patterns. Assume that the single adult needs 
the resource slightly less (for an equivalent health outcome). Still, plausibly the 
adult with dependents will be willing to pay less for the resource. In fact, 
willingness is not just a ratio of needs, for it is rather the individual’s own 
representation of this ratio, which will be epistemically imperfect, and also 
susceptible to influence by various pragmatic factors.44   
 
 
44 Compare Elster on adaptive preferences (1986, 107). 
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Thirdly, insofar as the price system plays an important epistemic role, it has 
significant limitations. As noted above, institutionalizing care can yield 
considerable epistemic benefits. The larger the organization, the greater their 
epistemic power, since they can draw on a sophisticated division of epistemic 
labour, enabling practioners to research and teach in their area of specialization. 
On a smaller scale, practitioners can also share knowledge about local 
idiosyncrasies, as when trainee learns about the quirks of this type of customer or 
that in the neighbourhood, or an apprentice learns a culturally distinctive 
technique. By contrast, efficient marketeers will fail to be responsive as such to the 
standards of good housebuilding, or good breadmaking, or good public health – 
or indeed, by any type-specific standards at all. The pressures to maximise market 
share reward optimization thinking rather than ideal-oriented thinking, which, in 
turn, lowers trust in aesthetic and engineering expertise. The implications are, by 
now, proverbial.45 And even if market pressures lead one to making excellent 
sourdough loaves, this will be a kind of coincidence, rather than an outcome 
guided by educated concern for the values at stake in their production.  
 
Fourthly, the allocation system will usually itself be larger. The allocating 
institution in the market case is not the firm but the entire market economy. The 
logic of invisible hand arguments pushes for more extensive markets: more 
competition, more substitutes, more flexible factors of production (including 
labour), etc. This is also part of the ‘logic’ of the microeconomic models: the 
tendency is to bring more phenomena into market contexts – consider the 
Pigouvian (1920) response to externalities – or at least to use the logic of the market 
to police its own boundaries – here consider the Coase-ian approach to transaction 
costs (1960). There is also an assumption of scale in Hayek’s ‘knowledge’ argument 
(1945): in suitably small collectives, there will usually be better ways to get the 
information.   
 
At this point, on behalf of efficient markets, one might appeal to the ‘will’ 
condition, arguing that the various inhibitions of care, and failures to enhance care, 
in market-structured production are imposed upon us by nature rather than by 
will, and hence are not alienating, any more than other natural constraints, such 
as the distribution of raw materials. And there some reasons to be sceptical. 
 
45 See, e.g., Marcuse (1964) and Tronto (2013, 129).  
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Consider the complexity of the supply chain in producing a car, for instance. 
Complete transparency is hardly likely to be worthwhile in any satisfactory 
productive system. But clearly greater transparency and control over larger 
patterns of production is possible. Greater discretion and control over the local 
deployment of resources is clearly also possible, even if at some cost to economic 
efficiency (which is an open question). Responsiveness to a larger body of evidence 
about how to meet specific needs is also clearly possible. And it is clearly possible 
to impose more structure on systems of production.  One can care in an institution 
to the extent that that institution is responsive to  two different levels of 
engagement: the overall distributive pattern of contributions and services and the 
individual level of engagement. Efficient markets can score fairly well on some 
distributive criteria. But they score very poorly on the individual criteria – this is 
precisely the point of the Exclusion-Fetishism argument.  
 
 
Section Seven:  Some Institutional Implications 
 
This discussion has suggested various approaches to mitigating alienation. One is 
to limit the scope of markets, meeting basic needs collectively and distributing on 
market terms only things that we merely want. This is an instance of a more 
general strategy. The extent of alienation in society is responsive to a number of 
gradable properties, in particular the degrees of distance between service and 
need: the invisibility of the price system, the complexity of trade-offs manifested 
in market behaviour, the exclusion of non-price-related information, and the 
overall size of the economic system. The extent of alienation in a society can be 
mitigated by institutions that are designed to reduce these degrees of distance.  
 
But these reforms will run up against the grain of the efficiency arguments 
themselves, which, as noted, are constantly pushing to expand the domain of the 
market and to purify the standing of its own rules in its own domain. It is an open 
question for further interdisciplinary investigation what will remain of the 
efficiency arguments when the extent and nature of the market domain is modified 
this way or that to accommodate alienation concerns.  
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But market socialism is not the only decentralized alternative to capitalism.46 There 
is another important class of alternatives, called ‘municipal socialism’ or 
‘participatory socialism’ or ‘socialism from below’ (cf. Hahnel & Albert 1991, 
Guinan & O’Neill 2019, Robertson 2020). Here the emphasis is, in the first instance, 
on decommodifying the means of production, reallocating control of capital from 
private corporations to local workers and municipalities. This approach is more 
directly a response to worries about exploitation and inequality, set aside earlier; 
but this approach would also address worries about alienation, insofar as 
individuals and communities are empowered to reorganise production to meet 
one another’s needs. Furthermore, an economic system that motivates by intrinsic 
values rather than extrinsic incentives, and that is based on cooperation rather 
than competition, could even be more efficient than a market system. The 
emphasis on management ‘from below’ also offers a prospect for addressing 
Hayek’s ‘knowledge problem’; as noted, plenty of knowledge is underutilized by 
exclusionary responsiveness to the price system. These are all further questions to 
be addressed in the pursuit of a more ‘suitable organizational technology’ for 
socialism – both as an economic and a political system.   
 
The central point is that the very depth and complexity of our productive 
interactions is a tremendous – and currently missed – opportunity to realize a 
range of important values in our productive lives. It seems worth entertaining the 
prospect of a more caring alternative: with individual caring relationships that are 
collaboratively responsive to relevant distributions of abilities and needs, at all 
levels of organization: the level of a particular service, an individual role, a 
particular organization, an industry; and that preserves important continuities 
with the values at stake in our un-marketised commitments – for instance 
reproductive and domestic labour, aesthetic pursuits, productive traditions and 
our relationship with the environment.47   
 
46 Notice that central planning would also be alienating, since individual contributions are 
still a significant organisational distance from any needs-meetings.  
47 Many thanks to Michael Bratman, Brookes Brown, Anthony Cross, Joran Dannenberg, 
Dave Estlund, Guy Fletcher, Johann Frick, Dave Gottlieb, Joseph Heath, David Hills, Chris 
Howard, Pat Hughes, the sadly late Waheed Hussain, Chris Melenovsky, Tristram 
McPherson, Ryan Muldoon, Austen McDougal, Oded Na’aman, Jeppe von Platz, Debra Satz, 
Geoff Sayre-McCord, Jonny Thakkar, Leif Wenar, Jack Woods, and audiences at The 
University at Buffalo, The University of Edinburgh, Stanford University, Washington 
University in St. Louis, and the Wharton School of Business.  
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